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The Rediff Special/ Sreedhar

One year of Musharraf's rule

On October 12, Pakistan celebrates the first anniversary of its fourth military rule. The immediate question that arises is: Has it done any good to Pakistan? What does the balance sheet of General Musharraf's rule thus far look like?

General Pervez Musharraf, who seized power in a bloodless coup on this day in 1999, tried to sound different. He called himself chief executive instead of martial law administrator. In the new set-up, he retained the civilian president and appointed a group of civilians, a mixture of retired bureaucrats and social workers, as members of the National Security Council, a new institution created to advise him on the governance of the state.

Though at a popular level all these measures were welcomed, the intelligentsia in Pakistan had reservations about his rule from the beginning. Four months before seizing power, he lost a war with India in Kargil. It is no secret in Pakistan that General Musharraf and his men launched the offensive without taking the political leadership into confidence. When the war became messy and Pakistan was isolated internationally, the armed forces prevailed upon the political leadership to step in and bail them out. This clearly showed that General Musharraf is a man without a vision for Pakistan. Despite the disclosures made by deposed prime minister Nawaz Sharif, Musharraf persistently refuses to hold an enquiry to fix the responsibility for the Kargil debacle.

At another level, many felt this is not an era of military rulers. The democracy wave is sweeping across the globe and authoritarian regimes are slowly getting replaced by popularly elected governments. Strangely, the reverse is happening in Pakistan. Therefore, the intelligentsia looked upon General Musharraf taking over as more of a move to keep himself in power than to save the country from the misrule of Nawaz Sharif.

Equally important is the fact that his methods to discredit politicians are too similar to those of his predecessors, Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul Haq. The initial euphoria about him and military rule subsided after three months and everyone is now questioning these methods. In fact, he made two tactical mistakes. One, to exempt the armed forces. The Pakistani press is full of stories about how the higher echelons of the armed forces made about $ 1 billion as kickbacks in defence deals. Many suspect that General Musharraf too got his share. Two, like his predecessors, he too trampled on the judiciary and destroyed the credibility of the rule of law in Pakistan. Simultaneously, his efforts to appease the political parties like Jamaat Ulema Islam and Jameet-e-Islam created new uncertainties.

The policies he pursued during the past one year clearly show that he is clueless about the direction in which Pakistan should move. As a man responsible for the Kargil campaign, he is not able to do much to check the spread of Islamic radicalism. In fact, Islamic radicals are spreading their tentacles towards central Asia. Some analysts say the local managers of the Islamic radical groups within the Pakistani army are pursuing their own agenda without the consent of the bosses in the GHQ in Rawalpindi. Other analysts suspect there is a vertical split among these Islamic radicals in Pakistan-Afghanistan -- some owe allegiance to Pakistani bosses and others to Osama bin Laden/Mullah Umar.

Knowing Pakistan's unwillingness to lose its clout in Afghanistan, the Osama bin Laden/Mullah Umar combine are pursuing their own agenda. With the result that, in Islamabad, no one seems to be sure of what is happening on that front.

What is surprising is that General Musharraf's government seems to be least concerned about the Talibanisation of the areas that border Afghanistan. In places like Malkand and Chitral, the administration has been brushed aside and Islamic laws, as interpreted by local mullahs, are being enforced.

Similarly, there is a growing feeling among the lower rungs in the armed forces that there is a need for converting Pakistan into a true Islamic state to get rid of all the problems facing the country. The higher echelons in the armed forces do not seem to be concerned about this development.

On the foreign policy front, Pakistan today is more isolated than it ever was in the past. General Musharraf's globe trotting, from Beijing to south east Asia to the Arab world to the United States, does not seem to have paid any dividends. What is worse, some of his hosts discreetly made it known that the Pakistani general solicited an invitation and thrust himself upon them.

The general's efforts to distinguish between jehad and terrorism has found few takers in the international community. The secretary general of the Commonwealth even visited Pakistan and told his hosts that generals must go back to the barracks and bring democracy back to Pakistan.

General Musharraf's only consolation seems to be the all weather Sino-Pak friendship has not yet been abandoned by Beijing. If China too starts behaving like America is doing -- keeping General Musharraf at a respectable distance -- Pakistan's problems will only increase.

On the economic front, the situation has gone from bad to worse. With Pakistan's debt, borrowed from abroad and domestically, being equivalent to its GDP for the last two years, the economy has started sinking. In addition, because of the general's support of jehad, which the world looks upon as terrorism, foreign direct investments have virtually stopped flowing in. The foreign investor is obviously uncomfortable about investing in a country which is a breeding ground for terrorists. The all round uncertainty is forcing the local entrepreneur to keep his export earnings in hard currency outside the country only.

The most optimistic estimate for the economic growth for the current year is around three per cent. This means Pakistan has to borrow money to repay even the debt installments from this year onwards. Any money lender would hesitate to lend in a situation where the future is so uncertain.

All in all, General Musharraf's balance sheet is not impressive. Whatever be his claims, he has only led the country further down the hill. What are his options in this situation? He can hand over power to another general and fade into oblivion. This is an unlikely scenario, since he is too ambitious. Alternatively, he can hand over power to an unknown politician and rule from behind the scenes like General Zia did. But such an action may not be too acceptable. The last and most possible alternative could to be to remove Tarar as president and hand over power to a person like Jaamat-e-Islam's Amir Quazi Hussein Ahmed, who has the street power to fight other Islamic radical groups and pacify Islamisationists.

All this is subject to the assumption that there will not be another coup in Pakistan in the coming weeks.

The Rediff Specials

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